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If the unitary quantum mechanical state evolution is universally valid, quantized systems evolve
uniformly, deterministically, and reversible; that is, one-to-one. Hence, what is considered an irre-
versible measurement might be a purely subjective, conventional, and convenient abstraction of the
situation that, although in principal totally reversible, for all practical purposes (fapp), measure-
ments cannot be undone. If this is granted, then Schro¨dinger’s “quantum jellification” arises because
of the inevitability of the physical co-existence of classically mutually exclusive states through quan-
tum coherence. It is suggested to take the rather unique human cognitive and perceptive experience
as evidence that, at least at the level of apperception, quantum jellification does not exist at all.
Otherwise the problems of how to characterize the ambivalence of perception and cognition induced
by quantum coherence on a fundamental level of cognition, and why this ambivalence appears to be
rather weak and can be ignored fapp, remain unsolved.
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I. COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE TWO
TYPES OF QUANTUM EVOLUTIONS
With regard to the evolution of the formal representa-
tion of any physical state there appear to be two principal
dual quantum modi operandi: (i) on the one hand quan-
tum mechanics postulates a deterministic, one-to-one
evolution of the state inbetween two irreversible measure-
ments; (ii) yet on the other hand irreversible measure-
ments are modelled by indeterministic and irreversible,
many-to-one mappings. This duality has already been re-
flected by Born [1, p. 804] (English translation in Ref. [2,
p. 302]) stating that “the motion of particles conforms
to the laws of probability, but the probability itself is
propagated in accordance with the law of causality. This
means that knowledge of a state in all points in a given
time determines the distribution of the state at all later
times.”
At the time of Born’s considerations, not too many
people seemed to have been concerned about the con-
sequences of these postulates for individual quanta, let
alone their intrinsic consistency. Alas, with increasing
intensity Schro¨dinger worried about the conceptual and
empirical ramifications associated with the assumption
of a dual quantum evolution. Early on, in a series of
centennial papers [3–5] he pointed out that, if the quan-
tum coexistence of classically distinct and even mutu-
ally exclusive states is taken for granted, then due to the
very different futures or consequences evolving from such
states – futures and consequences which can have very
different renditions on a macroscopic scale – seemingly
mindboggling if not outrightly absurd consequences fol-
low. The most famous such example is a cat being in
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a “coherent superposition between life and death.” One
may intensify Schro¨dinger’s concerns even more by con-
sidering this situation not from an external, outside point
of view, but from a quasi-conscious intrinsic [6] experi-
ence of an individual suspended in a coherent superposi-
tion between life and death. Alas, as Hilbert once point-
edly stated [7, p. 163], “the conception that facts and
events could contradict themselves appears to me as an
exemplar of thoughtlessness.”
Later on, Schro¨dinger addressed related issues by
pointing out that irreversible measurements (quasi con-
spicuously) appear to “save the day” by turning a quan-
tum superposition he termed “jelly fish” or “quagmire”
into a unique phenomenology [8, pp. 19–20]: “The idea
that [[the alternate measurement outcomes]] be not al-
ternatives but all really happening simultaneously seems
lunatic to [[the quantum theorist]], just impossible. He
thinks that if the laws of nature took this form for, let me
say, a quarter of an hour, we should find our surroundings
rapidly turning into a quagmire, a sort of a featureless
jelly or plasma, all contours becoming blurred, we our-
selves probably becoming jelly fish. It is strange that he
should believe this. For I understand he grants that un-
observed nature does behave this way – namely according
to the wave equation. . . . according to the quantum the-
orist, nature is prevented from rapid jellification only by
our perceiving or observing it.”
Very similar concerns have been raised by Everett [9],
who refers to Process 1 and Process 2 as “the discon-
tinuous change brought about by the observation of a
quantity,” and “the continuous, deterministic change of
state of an isolated system with time according to a wave
equation,” respectively. Everett then continues by con-
sidering “an isolated system consisting of an observer or
measuring apparatus, plus an object system. Can the
change with time of the state of the total system be de-
2scribed by Process 2? If so, then it would appear that
no discontinuous probabilistic process like Process 1 can
take place. If not, we are forced to admit that systems
which contain observers are not subject to the same kind
of quantum-mechanical description as we admit for all
other physical systems.” And so, pointedly stated, ei-
ther there is no such thing as an irreversible measure-
ment, or quantum mechanics is invalid; at least during
observations.
Presently the theoretical and empirical findings appear
to corroborate the former assumption of the impossibility
of an irreversible measurement. At least in principle, it
is commonly believed that any measurement can be un-
done [10–18], although for all practical purposes (fapp)
most measurements cannot be undone. Arguments for a
rapid tendency of coherent superpositions to become ef-
fectively classical due to environmental effect resulting in
the outflow of correlations and entanglement into uncon-
trollable regions of spacetime [19] contribute to a fapp
understanding, but they are of not much help when it
comes to questions of principle.
Strictly speaking, irreversible measurement do not ex-
ist. What is considered a “measurement,” and thus
the subject-object partition manifesting itself through
the cut between the measurement tool and the system,
between observer and object, fapp is a convenient ap-
proximation, if not an outright illusion. Any such dis-
tinction, though fapp acknowledged, must inevitably be
purely conventional [20]. Hence, from a principle point
of view, it remains totally unclear why we are not liv-
ing in a jellified universe characterized by Schro¨dinger’s
quagmire state consisting of a coherent superposition of
all possibilities and potentialities resulting from the (sup-
posedly random) choices which have simultaneously co-
existed and will remain to coexist forever. Everett’s as-
sumption of the simultaneous existence of (conscious) ob-
servers which are capable of surfing through this quag-
mire by always keeping a classical view of the picture,
thereby multiplying and branching off at every obser-
vation (with supposedly random outcome), appears to
be a highly questionable scenario. For we have not the
faintest idea how such a quasiclassical picture could be
maintained within the quantum quagmire, and neither
Everett nor anybody else has ever suggested how this
might come about.
Another issue is related to multipartite entanglement
across spatial distances. When measuring a concrete par-
ticle it cannot be excluded that this particle is not, say,
a partner of a pair of particles in a singlet state; with the
other partner “far away.” Moreover, interactions between
two systems may create a bigger entangled supersystem.
In classical physics measurement of a certain single parti-
cle property in a quasi-singlet state [21] would be totally
justifiable. This is due to the fact that the states of clas-
sical compound systems can be composed from the states
of the individual parts. This is due to the omniscience
a classical observer can at least in principal be endowed
with. From the principle of quantum complementarity
as well as from Bell-, Kochen-Specker- and Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger arguments this can no longer be assumed
quantum mechanically. In contrast, the information en-
coded in a quantum system, through entanglement, may
be distributed over some multipartite state; whereas mea-
surement of the individual constituents would render ar-
bitrary outcomes and might reveal nothing at all about
the encoding. For instance, the singlet state of two spin-
half particles is totally characterized by the joint prop-
erty that, when measured along two (or more orthogo-
nal) spatial directions, the outcomes of spin state mea-
surements of the individual particles are exactly oppo-
site [22, p. 640]. Any outcome of measurements on indi-
vidual particles reveals no information encoded originally
whatsoever; it is only after (re)combining the individual
outcomes that the information encoded in the joint corre-
lations can be extracted. It is this property of “distribu-
tive information” that is at the heart of certain speedups
in quantum computation, such as Deutsch’s algorithm.
Thus, in a strict sense, any entangled quantized system
shall never be considered to consist of individual sepa-
rated parts. Insisting on and forcing this partial view
renders an improper conception of the entangled mind.
II. EPISTEMIC INCOMPLETENESS VERSUS
PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNIQUENESS
In view of the conceptual difficulties discussed so far
it might not be totally unreasonable to pursue another,
epistemic, route. Suppose that the wave function is the
optimal representation of our intrinsic knowledge of a
quantized system rather than an objective state of the
universe; in Schro¨dinger’s own words, it is a catalogue of
expectations [3]. The representation of a physical system
may not be unique, and not even consistent, because, as
expressed by Bohr [23], it inevitably copes with “the im-
possibility of any sharp separation between the behavior
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring
instruments which serve to define the conditions under
which the phenomena appear. . . . Consequently, evidence
obtained under different experimental conditions cannot
be comprehended within a single picture, but must be
regarded as complementary in the sense that only the
totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible informa-
tion about the objects.” Bohr also might have suggested
that [24, p. 12] “there is no quantum world. There is only
an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics
concerns what we can say about nature.”
From this point of view, quantum theory might be con-
sidered a formalization of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.
In this scenario, Schro¨dinger’s quagmire could be avoided
by acknowledging that, while any physical system at any
particular step of evolution (characterized by time) is in a
single unique state, fapp this state remains incomprehen-
sible to intrinsic observers. The optimal representation
of this state is given by quantum mechanics, but as we
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Diagrammatical representation of two
interlinked Kochen-Specker contexts.
are inevitably ignorant of the “true” state, any formally
“complete” representation referring to all potential mea-
surement outcomes needs to be ambivalent from a clas-
sical point of view [7]. At the same time, the (at least
fapp) apparent uniqueness of our experience both of the
outside world as well as of our self image indicates that
we are not quagmires or jelly fish (hence the title relating
to Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy), thereby corrobo-
rating the assumptions of a unique but unknowable state
of the universe.
In what follows we shall briefly mention a few phe-
nomenological indications related to the epistemic ap-
proach just mentioned. Alas as these are neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for the above epistemological as-
sumptions, they cannot be considered either tests or
proofs. One argument [25] is against quantum contex-
tuality as exhibited by quantum mechanics itself. Bell
suggested [26, p. 451] that “the result of an observation
may reasonably depend . . . on the complete disposition
of the apparatus.” That is, the outcome of a measure-
ment of an observable may depend on what other com-
measurable observables are measured alongside of that
observable. The simplest nontrivial empirical setup to
test this assumption [25, 27–29] is the quantum logic
L12 [30, 31] whose structure of propositions is depicted
by the Greechie orthogonality diagram [32] (representing
orthogonal one-dimensional projectors by smooth, unbro-
ken lines) in Fig. 1.
In order to be able to use the type of counterfactual
inference employed by an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen [33]
setup, a multipartite quantum state has to be chosen
which satisfies the uniqueness property [34] with respect
to the two interlinked contexts (or, by another term, sub-
algebra) such that knowledge of a measurement outcome
of one particle entails the certainty that, if this observable
were measured on the other particle(s), the outcome of
the measurement would be a unique function of the out-
come of the measurement actually performed. Consider
the two spin-one particle singlet state
|ϕs〉 = 1√
3
(−|00〉+ | −+〉+ |+−〉)
and identify with the spin states the directions in
Hilbert space |+〉 = (1, 0, 0), |0〉 = (0, 1, 0), and
|−〉 = (0, 0, 1). In the Kronecker product representation,
|ϕs〉 = (1/
√
3) (0, 0, 1, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0). This singlet state
is form invariant under spatial rotations (but not under
all unitary transformations [35]) and thus satisfies the
uniqueness property for all such operations, just as the
ordinary Bell singlet state of two spin one-half quanta.
Hence, it is possible to employ a similar counterfactual
argument and establish two elements of physical reality
according to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criterion for
the two interlinked contexts (i.e., maximal systems of
commeasurable observables [30, 31]) depicted in Fig. 1.
For the sake of modeling observables corresponding to
the configuration depicted in Fig. 1, consider the maxi-
mal Kochen and Specker operators [36] defined by
C(α, β, γ) = 1
2
[
(α+ β − γ)J2(pi
2
, 0) + (α− β + γ)J2(pi
2
, pi
2
) + (β + γ − α)J2(0, 0)] ,
C′(α, β, γ) = 1
2
[
(α+ β − γ)J2(pi
2
, pi
4
) + (α − β + γ)J2(pi
2
, 3pi
4
) + (β + γ − α)J2(0, 0)] , (1)
for some real α 6= β 6= γ 6= α, where
J(θ, φ) =

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stands for the spin one observables (e.g., Refs. [35, 37])
in arbitrary directions measured in spherical coordinates.
0 ≤ θ ≤ π represents the polar angle in the x-z-plane
taken from the z-axis, and 0 ≤ ϕ < 2π is the azimuthal
angle in the x-y-plane taken from the x-axis.
The experimentally testable criterion for contextual-
ity can be stated as follows: Contextuality predicts that
there exist outcomes associated with α on one context C
which are accompanied by the outcomes ǫ or ζ for the
other context C′; likewise δ should be accompanied by β
and γ. The quantum mechanical expectation values can
be obtained from
Tr
{∣∣ϕs
〉 〈
ϕs
∣∣ · [C(α, β, γ) ⊗ C′(δ, ǫ, ζ)]} = 1
6
[2αδ + (β + γ)(ǫ+ ζ)] . (3)
4As a consequence, the outcomes α–ǫ, α–ζ, as well as β–δ
and γ–δ indicating contextuality do not occur. This is in
contradiction with the quantum contextuality hypothe-
sis.
Another possibility to experimentally corroborate the
assumption that quantum mechanics is an optimal epis-
temic theory about an inaccessible single and unique
ontological state (of the universe and thus of every-
thing physical) is to test the context translation prin-
ciple [38, 39] postulating the possibility to reduce, en-
hance and tune at will the capacity of a measurement
device to translate between the context prepared and
the context measured. Here, again, a quantum mechan-
ical context [31] (or subalgebra of the Hilbert logic) is a
maximal collection of commeasurable observables within
the nondistributive structure of quantum propositions.
It can be formalized by a single maximal self-adjoint op-
erator, such that every collection of mutually compatible
commeasurable operators (such as projectors correspond-
ing to yes–no propositions) are functions thereof [40, § 84]
(cf. also Ref. [41, Sec. II.10, p. 90]).
III. SUMMARY
In summary we have briefly considered three indica-
tions or criteria that might be capable of supporting
the notion of a quantum rendition of an essentially epis-
temic theory based on an unknowable “reality.” The first
evidence comes through self-introspection in the sense
of Descartes, by perceiving a rather unique and singu-
lar state of the external world, as well as of the ob-
server’s mind with regard to one’s own conscious self-
experience. The second argument is based on the in-
dependence of single outcomes from the accompanying
contexts in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setups, and the
third suggests to consider the capability of physical sys-
tems to translate between a mismatch of preparation and
measurement contexts. The consequences for the appli-
cability of quantum mechanical devices which might be
capable for potentially outperforming classical universal
computation, say by rendering true uncomputability [42],
are immense.
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